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THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: STANDING FOR
THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The racial barrier in the area of housing has been aptly labeled
the "cornerstone of segregation."' Congress, aware that segregatedhousing retards progress in the entire field of civil rights,2 hoped
that the Fair Housing Act of 19683 would undermine the "corner-
stone." For years the federal government itself pursued policies
which contributed in large measure to the concentration of racial
minorities in segregated neighborhoods.' However during the lastdecade all branches of national government acted to reverse pastpractices.' These efforts culminated in a statute which states thatit is now the policy of the United States to provide fair housing
throughout the entire country.6
However, mere enactment of any statute does not guaranteedesired results. Unfortunately large-scale voluntary compliance withTitle VIII has not materialized.8 It is apparent that desegregatedhousing will not come about until landowners and developers face
vigorous enforcement of the Act. Central to enforcement is the issue
of standing. To date, the right of private individuals to bring suit
under Title VIII has been restricted to the "direct victim" of adiscriminatory act.' It is possible that this narrow interpretation is
unnecessary under the terms of the statute. Once standing is estab-lished, the concept of private attorney general may permit a private-party plaintiff to correct past discriminatory acts as well as prevent
such acts in the future.
I REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIvIi DISORDER 475(New York Times ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON Civ. DISORDERS].2 E.g., 114 CONG. REC. 2697 (1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale): "[Those
closest to the problem regard the fair housing issue of fundamental and substantial
significance in the solution of social problems 
... 
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970).
4 Until 1949 the official policy of the Federal Housing Authority was to refuseinsurance to desegregated housing. Nondiscrimination pledges have been requiredfrom loan applicants only since 1962. REPORT ON Civ. DISORDERS, supra note 1, at 474.It was not until 1968 that the 1866 Civil Rights Act [42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)] washeld to apply to private discriminatory acts. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.409 (1968). See also 114 CONO. REC. 2526 (1968) (remarks of Senator Griffin).5 See e.g., Executive order 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 208 (1971).6 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
7 Id. §§ 3601-3619 [hereinafter noted in the text as Title VIII].8 See A REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL
CIvIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT (1971) [hereinafter cited as Civix. RIGHTS
REPORT].
9 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1971),aff'd 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. granted. 405 U.S. 915 (1972). See text
accompanying notes 107-10, infra.
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THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Title VIII is a major effort to deal meaningfully with the social
and economic evils of discrimination by providing a means whereby
racial minorities can obtain access to privately owned as well as
publicly owned housing units. To effectuate the proclaimed integra-
tion policy, Title VIII makes discrimination against any individual
on racial grounds in housing rentals,10 sales," financing,
12 and bro-
kerage services'" unlawful. Certain specified sales are excepted,"'
but the Act encompasses approximately 80% of the housing re-
sources of the country.15
Local fair housing laws providing comparable or broader cov-
erage and remedies are not preempted. 16 Title VIII establishes a
national minimum standard of open housing and is an additional
legal weapon in the attack on racially discriminatory housing prac-
tices which perpetuate segregated neighborhoods and the attendant
repercussions in other aspects of American life.
In addition to affording individual racial minority group mem-
bers an opportunity to obtain decent housing, the proponents of
Title VIII expected it would further many other goals. From a broad
societal viewpoint, the need to decelerate the breakdown of the
nation into two separate and hostile societies seemed urgent.
17 Al-
though under Congressional consideration previously, the serious
racial disorders during the summer of 1967 dramatically demon-
strated the need for a fair housing act. 8 The elimination of segre-
gated neighborhoods was viewed as essential to the desegregation
of schools.' 9 Few individuals would consider cross-town and cross-
county busing the preferable method of integrating public schools.
Housing patterns also have a direct effect in the area of employ-
10 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(d).
11 Id.
12 Id. § 3605.
13 Id. § 3606.
14 Excepted are private home sales in which the services of a broker are not
used, provided the owner does not own more than three such homes at the time of
sale and makes only one such sale in a 24-month period. Also excluded are owner-
occupied buildings of four units or less as well as boarding houses. Id. § 3603(b).
Many of the transactions excepted from Title VIII are covered by the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), construed in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
15 CivIm RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 8, at 141.
16 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c)-(d) (1970). This section does not preclude suit in federal
court when the complainant has substantially equivalent rights and judicial remedies
under state fair housing laws. (Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823, 825 (S.D. Ohio
1972)).
17 See e.g., 114 CoNG. REc. 9546-47 (1968) (remarks of Representative Lloyd).
18 See REPORT ON Civ. DIsoRDERS, supra note 1.
19 See e.g., Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) (by implication).
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ment. The movement of industry from cities to suburban areas hasbeen substantial since World War 11.20 Racial minorities, confined
to inner-city ghettos because suburban housing is closed to them,
have difficulty obtaining and keeping employment.21
The Act permits private parties who claim injury as a result of
a violation or who claim they will be irrevocably injured by animminent violation to file a complaint with the Department of Hous-ing and Urban Development (hereinafter HUD).2 2 HUD, although
entrusted with the administration of the Act,2 has limited enforce-
ment powers. The agency's enforcement capabilities are restricted
to the more informal methods of conference, conciliation, and per-
suasion.24 HUD lacks power to compel compliance through the is-
suance of cease and desist orders or injunctions.2 5 If HUD is unable
to obtain voluntary compliance, the complainant may institute suitin the appropriate federal district court.26 Alternatively, the com-
plainant may bypass HUD and commence action directly in federal
or state court.27 Additionally, the Attorney General is empowered
to bring suit in federal district court to correct a "pattern or prac-
tice" of discrimination. 2 The enforcement aspects of Title VIII
will be developed more fully below. 29
The realization that integrated housing is necessary to the
resolution of problems in related areas spurred Congress to enact
Title VIII. Racial discrimination in housing is not only a matter of
general public importance, however. Segregated neighborhoods af-fect the daily life of individuals of all races in many respects.When segregated neighborhoods are created or maintained through
the unlawful acts of landowners those suffering from the deprivation
of an integrated environment arguably have standing to enforce
Title VIII.
20 See REPORT ON Civ. DisoRDERs, supra note 1, at 392.
21 Id.
22 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970).
28 Id. § 3608.
24 Id. § 3610.
25 It has been strongly urged that Title VIII be amended to permit HUD to
issue cease and desist orders. This would facilitate the elimination of discriminatoryhousing practices through administrative action. Clvm RGHrTS REPORT, supra note
8, at 359.
26 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970).
27 Id. § 3612.
28 Id. at § 3613. The phrase "pattern or practice" is not defined in the statute.
However other civil-rights statutes employ the phrase. The discriminatory conduct
must be more than an isolated incident yet no set number of acts is necessary. UnitedStates v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1313-14 (D. Md. 1969). In United States v.Medical Soc'y of South Carolina, 298 F. Supp. 149 (D.S.C. 1969), the court applied
an objective test and maintained that conduct which predictably results in the virtual
exclusion of minorities constitutes a pattern or practice.
29 See text accompanying notes 97-126, infra.
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THE ISSUE OF STANDING
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp"0
sets forth two tests for standing. The first, which satisfies the art.
III limitations,"' is a claim by the plaintiff that the challenged con-
duct has "caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise."82 The
second requirement is that the plaintiff seek to protect an interest
that "is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."
8
Further, the Court emphasized that the interest need not be eco-
nomic but rather runs the gamut from the economic to the aes-
thetic.84 Indeed, the question whether a specific complainant has a
legal interest that is protected against violation by the statute is one
that goes to the merits as surely as does the question whether the
defendant violated the statute.88 Although no statutory provision is
necessary to confer standing when an interest is protected by stat-
ute,8 6 Title VIII expressly bestows standing on anyone aggrieved
by a violation of the Act.
7
Title VIII says that those who are providing housing accomo-
dations not excepted from the Act as well as specified related
services may not engage in the proscribed discriminatory conduct.
The right of private individuals to bring suit when the Act is
violated is set forth in two sections. Section 3610
s1 provides that
a "person aggrieved" may file a complaint with HUD. An aggrieved
person is defined as one who "claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be ir-
revocably injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is
about to occur."' 9 Section 3602 defines a discriminatory housing
practice as an act that is unlawful under other sections of the Act.
40
Section 3612 provides for enforcement of the "rights granted" by
civil action. Since the statute does not state the rights granted in
80 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
81 The judicial power of the United States is limited to cases or controversies.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
32 397 U.S. at 152.
88 Id. at 153. Some authorities feel the "zone of interest" test 
will prove
unworkable and that injury in fact will become the only test for standing. Id. at
167 (Brennan & White, J.J., concurring in the result). See also Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 450 (1970).
84 397 U.S. at 154.
85 Id. at 153.
36 Harden v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5 (1968).
37 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
88 Id. § 3610.
39 Id.
40 Id. §§ 3604-06.
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specific terms they will have to be inferred from the statute itself,
the legislative history, and the goals to be obtained.
Inasmuch as statutes can create new interests and rights,"the courts are not limited to previously established legal rights orinterests in their interpretation of Title VIII. Unquestionably,Congress intended Title VIII to serve as a means of ensuring that
racial minorities obtain housing they can afford in any area they
choose. 2 However, it does not necessarily follow that those directlydiscriminated against are the only individuals entitled to enforcethe Act. The author feels that Congress by enacting a broadly
worded "person aggrieved" statute created a cause of action infavor of any person who can demonstrate injury resulting from adiscriminatory act.
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,48 the courthad an opportunity to expound the interests protected by TitleVIII. White and black tenants challenged the racially discrimina-tory practices of their landlord. The plaintiffs claimed they weredenied the benefits of living in an integrated community because
of the purposeful and illegal exclusion of minority group membersfrom the housing facilities controlled by the defendant. Neither
the sufficiency of the injury nor the other merits were reached. Theaction was dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked stand-ing because they were not the "direct victims" of an unlawful
act. The plaintiffs did not allege any specific act of discrimination
committed against any specific person. The court maintained thatthe complaint was based on the maintenance of a "white ghetto" bythe defendant. The court said the suit was to correct a "pattern orpractice" of discrimination which only the Attorney General may
rectify. The holding that only the direct victim of a discriminatoryhousing practice has standing to sue sharply and unnecessarilylimits private enforcement powers under Title VIII.
The court is, in effect, maintaining that private parties mayenforce Title VIII only if their total injury arises out of one dis-criminatory act. The Ninth Circuit recognized that Congress en-
visioned the creation of integrated communities. Narrowly defining
an aggrieved person under the Act defeats this Congressionalgoal. The court points out that dismissal of the Trafficanti tenants'
41 See e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n,354 F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Nonprofit con-servationist organizations are aggrieved parties under the Federal Power Act and havestanding to protect their interest in aesthetic, conservational and recreational aspects
of power development. Id. at 616.42 See 114 CoNG. REc. 2279 (1968) (remarks of Senator Brooke).48 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. granted, 405 U.S. 915 (1972).
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cause of action does not mean that the matter would not be liti-
gated, inasmuch as black plaintiffs who had been refused housing
by the defendant had filed suit. However, if, Title VIII creates an
interest in living in an integrated environment, the fact that others
also have a cause of action should not preclude judicial redress for
injuries suffered by plaintiffs such as those in the Trafficante case.
In order to give effect to the goal of eliminating racial dis-
crimination, civil-rights statutes are broadly construed." In Miller
v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc.15 the court expressly disagreed
with the contention that such acts are to be narrowly construed.
Since segregated housing intensifies problems in other 
areas,41
this principle of construction should be applied to the housing act.
Indeed Congress recognized that many of the nation's other social
problems cannot be effectively resolved unless segregated neigh-
borhoods are eliminated and suburban housing made available to
racial minorities. 4
7
If broadly read, Title VIII can be interpreted as creating an
interest in being free from the effects of segregated neighborhoods.
This is not to say that there is an absolute statutory right to an in-
tegrated environmen 8 for Title VIII does not reach the economic
conditions that contribute to the perpetuation of ghettos.
49 The Act
does prohibit, however, the personal social views of landowners
from artifically determining the racial composition of a community
through the unlawful denial of housing accomodations to racial
minorities. Prior to the enactment of the Fair Housing Act, indi-
viduals wishing the benefits of living in a multi-racial community
had to actively seek out such a neighborhood. For a multitude of
reasons, including the fact that few such middle class neighborhoods
existed, this was seldom done. If only the "direct victim" of a dis-
criminatory refusal has standing to sue under Title VIII, the
position of those who do not wish to live in either white or black
islands has not been substantially bettered. This issue comes into
sharper focus when one considers the situation of a "token" minority
tenant. He is forced to choose between exercising his right to fair
44 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
45 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
46 See e.g., REPORT ON Civ. DIso DaEs, supra note 1.
47 See e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 9559 (1968) (remarks of Representative Celler).
48 Denial of an integrated environment to low income people has been said
to present a substantial constitutional question. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking
Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1970). See also
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.
1970); Shannon v. HUD, 305 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
49 Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669, 694
(W.D.N.Y. 1970).
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housing and his need to have among his neighbors some members
of his racial group.
Residency In An Area Should Be Sufficient For Standing
Residency in an area which is affected by a challenged actionhas been held sufficient for the necessary "personal stake" in the
outcome. Standing has been accorded to residents in the vicinity
of an urban renewal program on the basis of the impact of theplan in terms of neighborhood racial balance.5' HUD contended
that the plaintiffs did not have any of their property taken for theproject and were, therefore, no different from the public at large.The court said "Common sense indicates" that those who "literally
must live with the decision" are sufficiently interested in the charac-
ter of their neighborhood to merit standing to vindicate the values
which the statute seeks to further.12
Residents who object to discriminatory housing refusals intheir neighborhood are not officious interlopers challenging the
conduct of an individual with whom they have no relationship and
whose activities cannot have any adverse effects in their daily life.Rather they are objecting to unlawful conduct which has real con-
sequences in the personal, business, and social lives of themselves
and their families. The most obvious consequence is the interference
with the right of their children to an integrated education.5" Some
experience social embarrassment in living in a community whichis closed to minority friends and business associates. Others in
such fields as education and social work find that their professional
credibility with minority persons is undermined. Additionally, they
and their children are denied the benefits of neighborhood relation-
ships and contacts with many racial groups. Some genuinely feel
that this deprivation is injurious to themselves and their children.Many agree with Justice Douglas' remarks in his concurring
opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co.: 5 4 "The true curse of
slavery is not what it did to the black man but what it has done
to the white man." 5
50 Shannon v. HUD, 305 F. Supp. 205, 211 (E.D. Pa. 1969). This action was
brought under the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441 et seq.51 Id. Contra, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir.1971); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969) which denied standingto a black home owner to protest discriminatory site selection of a low income
housing project.
52 Shannon v. HUD, 305 F. Supp. 205, 211 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
53 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1970).
54 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
55 Id. at 445.
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In Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Board5" standing was
accorded to patients in the state's mental facilities for the purposes
of redressing discriminatory employment practices because of the
"secondary effects" on the plaintiffs as patients. 57 Students have
been given standing to protest discrimination in the employment
and assignment of teachers.58 Neither the patients nor the students
were the "direct victims" of the challenged discriminatory acts
in a strict sense. The interest of an individual in a "suitable living
environment"59 for himself and his family is surely as important
as an interest in a proper healing 0 or educational environment.
6
'
Title VIII was referred to as a bill of rights for education for
all people62 because the reality that segregated neighborhoods pro-
duced the segregated neighborhood school was beyond dispute.
63
In Lee v. Nyquist64 the court recognized that racial isolation in
schools is a product of local housing patterns. Our courts have, in
effect, been maintaining that black people are deprived when they
are denied contact with white people.6 5 Legal premises have evolved
to the point where it is recognized that in many respects white
people have been victimized by discrimination against blacks.
66 In
Hobson v. Hansen,67 an action brought by parents of white children,
the court held that their children were entitled to the benefit of an
integrated education to the extent it could be effectuated. In the
first decision on the matter 61 the court said that segregation pre-
cludes the social encounter between white and black which is an
essential attribute of education.
If courts are able to recognize the damage to the mind and
spirit of children of all races when they are subjected to a segre-
gated school system,69 it is not an unwarranted extension to recog-
56 297 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
57 Id. at 297.
58 Lee v. Macon Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967) (per curiam).
59 114 CONG. R c. 9559 (1968) (remarks of Representative Celler). Id. at 2526
(remarks of Senator Brooke).
60 See e.g., Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Board, 297 F. Supp. 291 (M.D.
Ala. 1969).
61 See e.g., Lee v. Macon Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967),
aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967) (per curiam).
62 114 CONG. REc. 2276 (1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale).
63 See e.g., Id.
6 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
65 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66 Hobson v. Hansen, 320 F. Supp. 720 (D.D.C. 1970). [An action by white
parents to enjoin the school board from taking a pupil placement action which
allowed white childern to leave an increasingly black school.]
67 Id.
68 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
69 See e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 320 F. Supp. 720 (D.D.C. 1970).
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nize that similar damage ensues when segregated play groups ofpreschoolers as well as segregated play groups of older children
exist. Socialization and learning are on-going processes which do
not begin and end at the school house door. Congress has the powerto eliminate racial discrimination and may do so by proscribing the
conduct of private individuals. 0 This power was exercised in both
respects in Title VIII. Congress could have limited standing to sueto the "direct victim," the isolated object of a discriminatory act.Instead Congress chose to bestow standing on anyone aggrieved by
a violation of the Act.7 ' Title VIII was intended as a vehicle tofoster the creation of integrated neighborhoods. When a privateindividual inhibits this development, he should be answerable to
anyone his conduct adversely affects.
Other Potentially Aggrieved Parties
Congress articulated several interests which Title VIII shouldfurther.2 Included among these is the competitive interest of thoseinvolved in the development, construction, sale, and rental of resi-dential property. The real estate interests informed Congress thatthey require a uniform standard of conduct which imposes on
everyone in the industry the same duty not to discriminate." Some
members of the housing industry feel obligated either morally orlegally to obey the law. Others will be under the coercion of judicialprocess. Absent standing to seek compliance on the part of their
competitors, these individuals are in an uncomfortable position.Compliant businessmen are certainly more exposed to economicpressure from the consumer market if recalcitrant businessmen arepermitted to compete uncontrolled in the same consumer market.74
An inability to find housing within reasonable proximity of
employment precludes many racial minorities from obtaining or ac-
cepting available jobs. 5 Consider the situation of an employer
whose offer of employment to an uniquely qualified black man is
rejected because desegregated local housing is not available.70 Abroad construction of the phrase "person aggrieved" would permit
70 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968).
71 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).72 See e.g., 114 CONo. Rac. 9560 (1968) (remarks of Representative CeIler).78 W. E. Buchanan, former president of the National Association of HomeBuilders, said that many in the industry would have discontinued discriminatorypolicies except for their fear of adverse economic consequences if their competitorscontinued to cater to racial prejudices. 114 CoNG. REc. 9554 (1968) (remarks ofRepresentative Madden).
74 Id.
75 See e.g., 114 CONG. Rac. 2529 (1968) (remarks of Senator Tydings).70 This hypothetical situation is not a figment of the author's imagination. The
author was peripherally involved in just such a situation some 15 years ago.
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employers to take action to protect their interest in obtaining work-
ers. Equal employment opportunity at all job levels is being vigor-
ously pursued by minority group members. By Executive Order No.
11512" the availability of low and moderate income housing is a
criteria in the selection of sites for federal installations. It is con-
ceivable that the day may come when private businesses will not
be able to relocate in areas where housing is not, in fact, open to
all social and ethnic groups.
The causal connection between segregated neighborhoods and
de facto segregated schools is well known. 8 This leaves school
districts in a difficult predicament. Desegregated schools are viewed
as a necessary component of a public-school education.79 To achieve
racial balance within their systems, school districts frequently must
expend substantial sums of money. When unlawful discriminatory
conduct by a landowner or a developer contributes to the problem,
school boards should be able to compel compliance with Title VIII 0
The Need to Expand Standing under Title VIII
The private enforcement of Title VIII has, to date, been left
largely to the individual minority group member who has suffered
discrimination at the hands of the offending landowner. This means
that many in the housing industry are permitted to continue their
discriminatory conduct. The realities of the situation should be
recognized. The "direct victim" of a discriminatory refusal may not
be certain the rejection was for racial reasons, particularly if an
offender engages in the practice of "tokenism." Further, landowners
are not as candid in their reasons for refusal as they might have
been prior to the Fair Housing Act. Those in regular contact with
an offending landowner may be in the best position to know the
motives for refusing an applicant.
Time and money are required to litigate the matter; the person
rejected may feel he cannot afford either. Additionally there is an
understandable reluctance to expose oneself to the pangs of a lawsuit
in which personal characteristics are put in issue. These factors
77 Issued Feb. 27, 1970, 3 C.F.R. 530 (1971).
78 See e.g., 114 CoNr. REc. 2276 (1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale). See also
REPORT ONq CIv. DISORDERS, supra note 1, at 424-27.
79 See e.g., Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970). [Challenging
statute banning assignments on the basis of race to achieve racial equality].
80 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970). Title VIII's coverage extends to public housing
as well as private housing. Although it is unlikely that school boards would bring
suit against small private landowners, owners of multiple housing units would be
likely defendants.
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probably contribute to the fact that few applicants who have been
refused housing pursue the remedies available to them.8'
The realization that an individual other than the one directly
discriminated against might be the most "effective adversary" to
litigate the matter has been an element in the judicial decision to
allow standing.8 2 Generally, one may not obtain standing to vindi-
cate the constitutional rights of absent third parties. This, however,
is a rule of practice which is not constitutionally mandated and
which can be overcome by a need to protect fundamental rights
which would otherwise be denied."' Courts, therefore, have per-
mitted legal rights of others to be raised both offensively8" and
defensively 5 where federally protected rights have been invaded.
One can understand the reluctance of a court to grant standing
to broad classes of plaintiffs, particularly when the defendant is a
private party. The author feels that the risk of harassment and
groundless lawsuits is not unbearably high. Title VIII requires a
private party to file his complaint within 180 days of a proscribed
act." The burden of proof is on the complainant.8 7 Damages are
discretionary with the court and are limited to actual damages and
a maximum of $1,000 punitive damages.88 The expense of prose-
cuting such a suit would deter groundless suits. However, the risk
of multiple lawsuits would serve as an incentive not to discriminate.
Title VIII depends upon litigation for its enforcement. Con-
sidering the prevalence of discrimination in housing, 9 very few
complaints are actually filedY0 To date, enforcement has been
limited to suits brought by the person discriminated against and the
81 S. DEUTSCH, FAIR HOUSING IN SANTA CLARA COUNTY (1971) (hereinafter
cited as FAIR HoUsNo REPORT); CiviL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 8, at 145-46.82 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969). This was
an action brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
83 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953).
84 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 232-40 (1969).
85 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
86 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1970). Whether the complainant proceeds directly in
federal court under section 3612 or with HUD, the action must be instituted within180 days. If the original complaint is filed with HUD under section 3610 and thedefendant is cooperating with the conciliation effort, the statute of limitations periodfor commencing action in district court is tolled. However, the complainant mayfile suit only against the individual named in his original complaint if the matter is
not satisfactorily resolved. James v. Hafter, 320 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
87 42 U.S.C. § 3610(e) (1970).
88 Id. § 3612(c).
89 See FAIR HOUSING REPORT, supra note 81.
90 342 complaints from California were received by HUD during the period
July 1, 1970 to July 31, 1971. Id. at 19. Fewer than 1500 complaints were received byHUD nationwide in the two-year period after enactment of Title VIII. CrviL RIGHTS
REPORT, supra note 8, at 146.
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Justice Department. This limitation is a major reason for the in-
effectiveness of Title VIII in achieving its goals.
The right of the Attorney General to originate suits under Title
VIII is an important enforcement tool. However, realistically he
should not be expected to do the total job. The vigor with which the
Attorney General will pursue the right afforded to him will depend
on the Administration's philosophy regarding the goal and the funds
and manpower resources available. The Attorney General has a
limited staff for civil rights enforcement. The housing section of
the Civil Rights Division has but eighteen attorneys to service the
entire United States."
Testimony was offered at the Senate Hearings on the Fair
Housing Act which indicated that residential separation of the races
is a universal characteristic of American life. 92 Considering the
national scope of housing discrimination and the limited resources
available for the resolution of that problem, it is difficult to see
how Congress could reasonably have intended to achieve its goal of
nationwide fair housing by relying solely on the Attorney General to
correct a "pattern or practice" of discrimination. The Court adopted
this rationale in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,93 a case
involving discrimination in a drive-in restaurant brought under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 The Supreme Court noted that when
Title II passed "it was evident that enforcement would prove
difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law."95
Enforcement of Title VIII also depends upon private litigation.
Expanding the classes of plaintiffs entitled to enforce the Act ob-
viously increases the possibility that the Act will be effective in
achieving its purposes. If standing is allowed on a broad basis,
those individuals and groups desirous of living in an integrated
community could take effective steps to redress any unlawful public
or private interference with this desire. Once standing is present,
a broad spectrum of relief is available to correct the effects of past
discriminatory acts as well as to prevent future ones.9" Broad cover-
91 Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 33, Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971) supporting plaintiffs' contention that
as tenants they had standing under Title VIII.
92 114 CoNG. REC. 2280 (1968) (remarks of Senator Brooke).
93 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
94 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-(h) (1970). This case was brought under Title II,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-03(a) (1970).
95 390 U.S. at 401.
96 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) provides: "The court may grant as relief, as it deems
appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order,
or other order .... " For limits on monetary damages, see text accompanying note
88, supra.
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age and remedies not coupled with vigorous enforcement, however,
will not eliminate racial discrimination in housing to any significant
degree.
ENFORCEMENT
The Powers of the Attorney General
Section 3613 of Title V111 97 bestows a discretionary power on
the Attorney General to bring suit in federal district court when
he believes a person or group is resisting the Act or otherwise
engaging in conduct which has the effect of denying any group their
rights under any section of Title VIII. Although his belief should
be based on reasonable cause, the courts see their function as one
of determining if there is a "pattern or practice" of discrimination
and not one of inquiring into the basis for the belief.98 The court
makes no preliminary determination concerning the reasonableness
of the exercise of discretion by the Attorney General. 9
Unlike sections 3610 and 3612 which require a specific dis-
criminatory act within the previous 180 days before a private
individual may initiate action, section 3613 has no such statute-of-
limitations period. If interpretation of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act'00 is to serve as precedent'' for the interpretation
of the Fair Housing Act, it is possible that the "pattern or practice"
of discrimination could have its origins in circumstances or conduct
predating the passage of Title VIII.'02
In a government suit against a labor union"° for racial discrim-
ination in violation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act,104
a collective bargaining agreement which set up a system of priorities
for work referrals was modified as it affected black members.
Work experience obtained by union members during the time the
union did not admit blacks to membership was counted in deter-
mining the order of priority for work referral. Consequently, newly
97 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970).98 United States v. Mitchell, 313 F. Supp. 299, 300 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
99 Id.; cf. United States v. Gray, 315 F. Supp. 13 (D.R.I. 1970), an action
brought under Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1970).100 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. (1970) [hereinafter noted in the text as Title VIII.101 The language of section 2000(e)(6) of Title VII is very similar to that of
section 3613 of Title VIII. Section 2000(e)(6) requires an element of intent to denythe full exercise of employment rights whereas section 3613 merely requires that
housing rights be denied to any group.102 See United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 139 (8th Cir. 1969).103 United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969).
104 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) ef seq. (1970).
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admitted black members received the lowest priority. There was no
record of union discrimination in admissions after the passage of
Title VII. The Court held that the system of priorities preserved the
effects of previous discriminatory practices which resulted in present
and future discrimination and as such was a violation of Title VII.
Comparable situations need correction in the housing area. In
United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp.,105 the Attorney
General brought suit against the owner of a 96-unit apartment
building. The lower court, after finding that the defendant landlord
had pursued discriminatory practices prior to the passage of Title
VIII, held that the government failed to establish a "pattern or
practice" of discrimination after the effective date of the Act. In
overruling the lower court, the Fifth Circuit said that where there
is a finding of pre-Act discriminatory practices and little or no
evidence to show that such conduct has changed, a strong inference
that there has been no change arises. Standing alone this will not
establish a prima facie case of present discrimination but its proba-
tive value is significant. Even though in this case there were two
known discriminatory refusals after Title VIII was in effect, the
tenor of the court's opinion was such that if there were other
evidence that a pre-Act discriminatory practice had not been dis-
continued, the "pattern or practice" of discrimination could have
been established.
The role of the Attorney General in the enforcement of Title
VIII is very important. As noted above, however, his ability to
make full use of his powers under Title VIII is limited.'
°6 Aggrieved
parties bringing suit as private attorneys general could be extremely
effective in eliminating racially discriminatory practices on the part
of offending landowners.
The Private Attorney General
Section 3610(d) and 3612(c) permits a private individual to
obtain a broad spectrum of affirmative and other relief including
temporary restraining orders, temporary and permanent injunctions,
and any other order the court feels is appropriate. Such broad
remedies could be effectively used to permit a private party to secure
the elimination of all acts of discrimination practiced by the de-
fendant. Such a view would be consistent with the current practice
in the enforcement of other civil rights acts.' The Fair Housing
105 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971).
100 See text accompanying note 91, supra.
107 See e.g., Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 407 (S. D. Ohio 1968).
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Act, as part of the total effort to rid this society of the inequities of
racial discrimination, should be liberally construed to effect its goals.
The record in the civil rights area is replete with cases in which
the concept of private attorney general is used to control the conduct
of private-party defendants as it affects those other than the
plaintiff.' 8 In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,"°9 the
Supreme Court said that a Title II suit is private only in its form
and that if the complainant obtains an injunction "he does so not forhimself alone but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a
policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.""' The
effectiveness of a statute such as the Fair Housing Act depends upon
obtaining judicial decrees which compel an offender to comply with
its terms. Particularly with respect to remedies, judicial treatment of
Title VIII should not be different from that afforded to other civil
rights statutes.
Mootness
Once an individual files a complaint, the question should not
become moot merely because the defendant corrects the act which
serves as the basis for the complaint. In Jenkins v. United Gas
Corp."' a black employee brought suit against his employer for
discriminatory promotion policies. Subsequent to the commencement
of the action, the plaintiff employee was offered and he accepted
the previously denied promotion. The Fifth Circuit held that the
suit was not moot either to the employee or to the class he repre-
sents. The court, in noting the role private litigation plays in ef-
fectuating Congressional policies, said that the plaintiff in such an
action "takes on the mantel of the sovereign.""' 2 There are two
elements in the plaintiff's charge, namely, that he has been denied
a specific employment opportunity and that the denial was based
on discrimination banned by Title VII. The court found that the
second element was a matter of "extreme importance with heavy
overtones of public interest," and that the suit was therefore com-
parable to a class action for others similarly situated." 3
The Fourth Circuit refused to dismiss an action when the
specific discriminatory act on which it was based was subsequently
108 See e.g., Cypress v. Newport News Gen. and Nonsectarian Hospital Ass'n,
375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967) [Title VI]. Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F.
Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio 1968) [Civil Rights Act of 1866].109 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
110 Id. at 402.
111 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
112 Id. at 32.
113 Id. at 32-33. The court did not hold that a private attorney general may not
dismiss his suit without court approval, but rather that the court may not do so over
his objection without reaching the merits.
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rectified." 4 Even though the plaintiff-doctor was granted active staff
privileges, black doctors in the area as well as their patients were
considered plaintiffs who were entitled to injunctive relief. The
court recognized the unwillingness of minority individuals to subject
themselves to the humiliation of a refusal. The court said that the
failure of other black physicians to apply for staff privileges at the
defendant hospital was due to the realization that such an effort
would be useless in light of the well known discriminatory policies
of the defendant.
A victim of housing discrimination generally has an immediate
housing need which must be satisfied. Frequently the offer of hous-
ing will come long after the victim is settled in new accomodations
which he will be reluctant to leave. If a landowner is able to render
the matter moot by offering a housing opportunity to the victim of
his discriminatory act, the pace of neighborhood desegregation is
slowed. Housing discrimination is a matter of great public impor-
tance in much the same way as is discrimination in employment and
public accomodations. Applying the Title VII interpretation of the
Fifth Circuit in Jenkins v. United Gas Corp."' and the Fourth Cir-
cuit's holding on mootness in Cypress v. Newport News Gen. and
Nonsectarian Hospital Ass'n, Inc.116 to the Fair Housing Act per-
mits a complainant to insure that the offending landowner will not
continue his discriminatory ways.
Degree of Relief Available
To date, Title VIII has not produced much case law." 7 How-
ever, the growing case law of other civil rights statutes should have
114 Cypress v. Newport News Gen. and Nonsectarian Hospital Ass'n, Inc., 375
F.2d 648, 657 (4th Cir. 1967). This action was brought under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(d) et seq. (1970).
115 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
116 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
117 Most complainants proceed under section 3610 (42 U.S.C.) by filing a
complaint with HUD. Section 3610(c) provides that if there is a state or local fair
housing law which provides substantially equivalent rights and remedies for dis-
criminatory housing practices, HUD shall refer the complaint to the appropriate
state or local agency. In the majority of cases this referral is entirely unproductive.
The complaint is returned to HUD without any substantive action on the part of
the local agency. 82% of the complaints received by HUD from California were
referred to the Fair Employment Practice Commission. 82.3% of these were returned
to HUD for further action. Presently, area offices of HUD receive the complaints.
These offices cover a large geographical area. For example, the area office in San
Francisco receives the complaints from most of northern California including those
from the heavily populated Santa Clara County. Consequently, a complainant must
frequently make repeated long-distance trips to press his grievance. HUD is further
limited in the discharge of its administrative and enforcement responsibilities as
provided in sections 3608 and 3610, because it does not have the power to issue
cease and desist orders or employ other judicial remedies which would permit HUD
to eliminate housing discrimination through administrative action. FAIR HOsING
REPORT, supra note 81, at 19.
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precedential value in the interpretation of the Act. Courts have
granted relief to redress not only the discriminatory act on which
the complaint is based, but also to prevent future acts of discrimina-
tion on the part of the defendant. 18 Under the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act, ... the courts have held that the effects of pre-Act
discrimination can be redressed by an aggrieved party. °
In Marquez v. Omaha District Sales Office, Ford Division,'
the defendant's existing promotion system denied advancement toindividuals solely for lack of ability or experience. The plaintiff,
several years prior to the passage of Title VII, had been denied pro-
motions because of his race. Consequently, he was not eligible for
advancement to the level he would have attained had the past
discriminatory policies not existed. The court held that when a
promotion scheme, albeit neutral on its face, serves to perpetuate
the effects of past discrimination, "it rejuvenates the past discrim-
ination in both fact and law regardless of present good faith.') 22
Acknowledging that Title VII was intended to have future applica-
tion only, the court went on the say that relief may nevertheless be
granted to remedy "present and continuing effects of past discrim-
ination.' 2  This would be a useful concept in the housing field
particularly with respect to desirable apartment complexes with long
waiting lists for initial placement or for access to the larger and
more desirable units.
In Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc.,24 the black plaintiffs who
were unable to purchase a lot for a vacation home brought suit
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.125 Upon a finding that the
refusal to sell to the plaintiffs as well as to other black people was
for racial reasons only, the court issued a general anti-discrimination
injunction which banned discrimination in all future lot transac-
tions. The 1866 statute is silent on the relief a plaintiff may obtain.
The court, however, did not hesitate to apply the concept of private
attorney general and thereby insure that the defendant did not
118 See e.g., Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 408, 418 (S.D. Ohio
1968). [Discriminatory refusal to sell plaintiff a lot for a vacation home.]
119 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. (1970).
120 See e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'din part on other grounds, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This action was brought under TitleVII which has a 90-day statute of limitations period. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(1)-(5)(d)(1970). The court said, "'Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation ofNegro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the act.'" 420 F.2d
at 1230, quoting from Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D.
Va. 1968).
121 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971).
122 Id. at 1160.
128 Id.
124 308 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
125 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
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discriminate on racial grounds in the future. Title VIII, with its
full panoply of judicial remedies, should receive a similar judicial
construction.
CONCLUSIONS
Title VIII is a forward step but it has not measured up to the
expectations of its proponents.'26 The goal of integrated neighbor-
hoods has not been materially advanced and racial discrimination
in housing presently exists on a broad scale. 12 7 Persons aggrieved
under the Act should include all who have the racial composition
of their neighborhoods, their schools, or their social, business and
professional relationships affected by an unlawful discriminatory
act. In Walker v. Pointer,2  a case brought under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866129 by a white plaintiff, the court said that to hold "that
only those suffering from discrimination against black people who
happen to be black come within the protection of the statute ...
would ... be to read in [section] 1982 a racist purpose."'1 °
If the courts will not liberally construe Title VIII as creating
a statutory right for all Americans to live in an integrated environ-
ment, the Act should be amended to provide this in clear and un-
equivocal terms. Traditional concepts of private property and rights
therein unfortunately lend an emotional overtone to the issue of fair
housing. Indeed the debates preceding the enactment of Title VIII
reflect the uneasiness with which the abridgement of any aspect of
private property rights is viewed. 8' Nonetheless Congress did
choose to prefer the benefits of fair housing over the right of a
landowner to dispose of his property if he does so in a racially
discriminatory fashion.
Carole V. Harker
126 See CivI RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 8; FAIR HOUSINO REPORT, supra note
81.
127 See e.g., FAIR HOUSING REPORT, supra note 81.
128 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969). See also, Williamson v. Hampton Manage-
ment Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146, 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1972) in which the court said that a
"white plaintiff upon whom a discrimination against black persons has an impact
may bring an action" under Title VIII.
129 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
130 304 F. Supp. at 60. [Action for damages against a landlord for an eviction
because the plaintiff had black friends visit.] The court, quoting from Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), further said that classifications based on race are
against our traditions and are constitutionally suspect.
181 See e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 9528 (1968) (remarks of Representative Mont-
gomery).
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